Abstract-Prominent characteristics of systems in the aerospace domain are that they are inherently complex, they must operate under tight resource constraints, and are often parts of a larger system of systems that must be reliable. These systems communicate with each other to exchange data and control information to together fulfill a larger task. In such a setup, the reliability of the communication channel plays a central role in the reliability of the entire system of systems and thus determines the success of fulfilling the larger task. Ensuring such a reliable communication is difficult due to several reasons: (1) the systems are developed independently by different teams at different locations, (2) the specification of the expected communication behavior is ambiguous, and (3) issues in the communication are often subtle and remain uncovered for a long time with the effect that bandwidth and other precious resources are wasted. We are proposing an approach called Dynamic Software Architecture Visualization and Evaluation (DynSAVE) to detect problems in the communication between systems by analyzing their communication behavior. The approach is divided into three main steps. The first step is the non-intrusive monitoring and recording of low level network traffic, the second step converts these raw communication records into meaningful messages, and the third step visualizes this abstracted information in such a way that issues can be detected. In this paper we discuss how the approach was applied to the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) File Delivery Protocol (CFDP), which is used for satellite communication by the JHU/APL Common Ground System. The approach has proven to be useful for understanding the communication behavior and uncovering subtle issues due to emerging system behaviors.
INTRODUCTION
JHU/APL has developed and operates a network of applications (systems) called the Common Ground System in which a number of systems communicate to perform certain tasks [MCK03] . In the past, issues related to the communication have been reported frequently but no approach or tool support has been available to allow for analyzing the anomalous communication behavior. We have studied these problems, classified them and developed an approach called DynSAVE for analyzing these issues. In particular, we have developed a classification of anomalies that can occur in a network communication. We have developed an approach for capturing the communication behavior, processing it, and visualizing a representation of the communication in a way that is meaningful to analysts. This visualization aims to support the analysis task for solving communication issues. The approach has been applied to the Common Ground System to detect serious issues in the communication behavior. The contributions of this paper are (1) a theoretical framework that defines the type of anomalies that can occur in a communication, (2) an approach for visualizing the communication behavior, and (3) a case study that evaluates the usefulness of the approach in supporting analysts in detecting anomalies and resolve the existing issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides the context of this work and introduces the problem. Section three identifies the anomaly classes and section four describes our approach for analyzing these anomalies. Section five presents a cases study to illustrate the analysis of real communication traces. We conclude the paper by summarizing the current results and outlining future work in section six.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The JHU/APL Space Department develops Mission Operations Center (MOC) system software using a shared architecture called the Common Ground System for all JHU/APL-supported NASA missions. This work was motivated by an analysis of JHU/APL's databases of change requests and anomaly reports related to the Common Ground System. JHU/APL's NASA missions use the Common Ground System for spacecraft Integration and Test and operations. The software is currently supporting operations for three deep space missions. The analysis of JHU/APL's databases of change requests and anomaly reports identified a number of significant problems related to communications between the Common Ground System and other systems such as the Flight Software, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Deep Space Mission System, the JHU/APL Ground Support Equipment, and the remote Payload Operations Centers. Interface Control Documents (ICD) specify the communications between the Common Ground System and each of these external systems. However, JHU/APL frequently encounters systems that do not comply with ICD's. The ICDs are typically large specifications written in natural language, making them inherently ambiguous and difficult to fully understand. Systems may not comply because of differences in interpretation among developers and/or errors in implementation. In this paper we analyze and discuss CFDP, a standard protocol suitable for the transmission of files to and from spacecraft data storage that is described as an ICD. A subset of CFDP is currently being used by the MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry, and Ranging (MESSENGER) deep space mission and the Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) near-earth mission plans to use CFDP. Current CFDP performance analysis is based on manual inspection. DynSAVE, which is the approach that we are developing to analyze such communication, provides higher level visualization and automated comparisons between planned and actual behaviors. DynSAVE will make it possible to automate comparison of planned to actual CFDP performance. An example presented below demonstrates how DynSAVE can be used to characterize actual CFDP performance and guide tuning of the software configuration for a specific application.
Context
Figure 1 shows a subset of the systems that are involved in transporting data from space to the ground to the user and how they communicate. The satellite carries a number of instruments, for example, cameras that capture images of elements in space, and a limited storage system for storing captured data. The data is transferred to the archive server However, a number of factors make it not only difficult to implement a correct communication but also make it burdensome to verify that the systems interact in the specified way:
(1) The systems are often developed independently from each other by different development teams at different locations.
(2) The communication behavior of each individual system is not and cannot be fully tested in the environment it will eventually operate in, but rather by using components that simulate the communication of other systems.
(3) The ICD that specifies the protocol is ambiguous as it omits details allowing developers to interpret the protocol differently.
(4) The ICD consists of hundreds of pages of text written in natural language, making it difficult for developers to fully understand and implement. In the case of CFDP, most implementations only support the commonly used features of the protocol, so issues with integration of differing subset implementations emerge.
(5) Many clients exist that implement the ICD protocol and it would be a significant effort to update them if the protocol was changed.
(6) Violations of the protocol are not clearly visible but manifest themselves as some kind of misbehavior.
The combination of these points leads to implementations of the protocol that often deviate from the intended behavior.
However, because the ICD does specify the basic properties of the protocol unambiguously, which often eventually leads to the system producing correct end-results, the deviations between the implementations are rather subtle. JHU/APL has found that the differences in interpreting and implementing the ICD are not discovered until integration of the systems that supposedly comply with the specification. This means that they are difficult to detect and often remain in the system for long times causing the issues described previously.
Research Questions
The goal of this work is to develop an approach for supporting the analysis of communication behavior and ultimately uncovering even subtle deviations. The greater goal is to achieve a high reliability of the communication and to increase its efficiency without significantly increasing the cost of software development and testing. This paper presents a case study that evaluates to what extent the suggested approach can help analysts uncover issues in the communication behavior. In particular, the research questions we addressed are:
(1) Does the visualization enable analysts to detect deviations in the communication?
(2) Does the visualization provide enough context information to facilitate the reasoning about the deviations and to ultimately determine the sources of the problems?
The case study discusses example traces and describes an analysis as it actually took place. The discussion will then be used to address the questions posed above.
ANOMALY CLASSES
The issue reports that were collected in the past contain the description of communication issues in terms of misbehavior of the communication channel. We have studied a series of communication traces that were recorded during the execution between test software communicating using CFDP and analyzed what anomalies caused the misbehaviors. The set of traces we studied are, according to the architect, representative for the type of communication issues that have been experienced in the past. Hereafter, we will use the terms anomaly and deviation interchangeable to refer to any kind of behavior that is not intended by the designer of the protocol. Please note that the intended behavior is not always completely documented in the ICD due to the omission problems discussed above. We analyzed the characteristics of the traces and discussed them with JHU/APL architect to establish anomaly classes to guide our verification efforts. The classes are based on the properties of the communication whose values can deviate from the intended values:
• Sequences
• Parameters
• Timing
We will now elaborate on each of these characteristics.
Sequences
In its most basic form, a protocol defines the names of the messages that are being exchanged and the order thereof. We will also refer to the name of a message as its type as it indicates the role of the message in the protocol. For instance, a message could be called "MetaData message," which expresses that the message says something about the transmitted data. In some ICD's, the expected sequence of messages are specified using sequence diagrams, such as the one shown in Figure 2 . The rectangular boxes represent the names of the systems. The arrows are messages that are sent from one system to another. Each message is annotated with an identifier (or message type). Communications can often be divided in phases. In each phase, the systems send only certain kinds of information and also expect to receive certain kinds of information. In the case of a file sent from the satellite to the MOC, the first phase is the one in which the satellite sends a MetaData (M in the diagram) message followed by FileData messages Control and data messages alike encode certain information that is processed by the systems to control their behavior. We will refer to this information hereafter as message parameters. A parameter could be the start and end offset for a FileData message or the size of the file being transferred as a parameter of the MetaData message. The ICD specifies the parameters for each message type and often defines a set of parameter values valid in a given context as well as default values. Thus, the CFDP protocol specifies constraints on the parameter values that need to be adhered to by the systems implementing the protocol. For example, a constraint that specifies the valid values for the length of the file to be transferred is as follows:
MetaData.FileLength >= 0
Zero-length files are allowed according to the specification because zero is defined to be "unbounded", which means the file size was unknown at the time of Metadata transmission. The constraint that is defined on the FileLength parameter is local because the scope of the constraint does not depend on the context in which these messages occur. In contrast, the result of global constraints depends on the history of messages. The following example illustrates global constraints as defined for the CFDP protocol:
AND (FileData.EndOffset < MetaData.FileLength
The parameters StartOffset and EndOffset specify start and end of chunk of data that was sent. The constraint is global because it cannot be evaluated independently but is defined over a set of parameter values. If the participating systems do not adhere to the constraints as specified by the CFDP protocol, the data transfer will fail.
Timing
We have previously stressed the point that the systems in the aerospace domain operate under tight time constraints. In terms of messages that are being exchanged, this means that (1) a message needs to occur within a certain time after the previous message, and (2) the entire exchange of information (from establishing the connection to closing it) needs to occur within a certain amount of time. Failure to do so results in a lower servicing speed, e.g. fewer data records can be downloaded from the satellite in the given time. Just as for the parameters, constraints are defined on the timing of messages. Timing constraints specify the maximum amount of time that may elapse between two messages. A constraint that is defined for the CFDP protocol specifies the timeframe in which "Data" messages must be transmitted:
with
Here, the 1 second setting is an arbitrary number. The timing constraint are "tuning parameters" that are specified by the analyst based on knowledge of the specific transactions being analyzed. In this example, a FileData message must occur within 1 second after the previous FileData message. Similar to the constraints on parameters, we distinguish between local and global constraints for timing. The above example constraint is local as it relates two consecutive messages. A global timing constraint is defined on a series of messages and specifies the time the entire sequence may take. A global timing constraint could specify how long an entire communication sequence for a client may take:
300 seconds is also an arbitrary number and tunable by the analyst. The message of the type "Open" indicates the initiation of the communication and the "Close" message terminates the communication. The definition of anomaly classes drives our verification approach and should guide analysts in finding communication issues.
APPROACH
We are now presenting the approach we have developed for analyzing communication behaviors, detecting the anomalies discussed above, and discovering the sources of the problems. The communication between systems is difficult to comprehend without appropriate tool support. Not only does each system send many messages in a short amount of time, but when multiple systems communicate, the messages are interleaved making each session difficult to follow. In the case of the communication between the satellite and the MOC, this means that there, at any given time, might be several concurrent file transfers. To be able to detect anomalies, one needs to be able to untangle the various communications. A mere signaling of an anomaly without much additional information would not be enough to understand in which situation that anomaly arose. This would make it difficult to debug the system that produced the anomaly. Thus, we are proposing an approach that is based on detecting and understanding anomalies with the goal of enabling the developers to quickly find the source of the issue. The key to this understanding is the appropriate visualization of the communication. An appropriate visualization is one that allows the analyst to quickly derive an understanding of the communication behavior and identify any anomalies. In our approach, the communication is first captured, then any processing and analysis is being conducted offline in order to intrude on the systems as little as possible. The approach is implemented in a serious of steps, each supported by a tool, to capture the communication and eventually visualize it to the user (see Figure 3 ). In the first step, the communication is monitored and recorded in its raw format, i.e. as a series of bytes. The second step transforms the byte-stream into a meaningful representation of the communication trace, the third step visualizes the transformed data in a graphical user interface and the fourth step compares the planned trace to the actual identifying deviations. We will now elaborate on each of these steps and the challenges involved. 
Recording Communication
For capturing the communication behavior we took into account two main criteria: (1) the systems cannot be modified so as not to compromise their reliability and (2) the capturing should not impact the performance of the systems. In the operational MESSENGER system, we record each command transfer frame in a text-formatted log file, and each downlink transfer frame in a binary file. This data is recorded as part of our standard operating procedures, so there is no additional performance impact due to protocol validation data capture. RBSP will most likely have similar operating procedures.
When running in the standalone testing environment, where the transport layer is User Datagram Protocol (UDP), we used Ethereal (current version called Wireshark) on the RBSP Linux software development systems to capture the CFDP test program traces in libpcap format. In the operational systems, we generate the libcap format offline from the recorded frame data. This process guarantees that the systems themselves remain unchanged. However, because the data is captured in a format that is difficult to read, an additional processing step was added to facilitate interpretation of the byte-stream.
Interpreting the Raw Data
The output of Wireshark is a hexadecimal representation of the TCP/UDP packets that are transmitted as a sequence of bytes. As illustrated in Figure 4 , this step parses the bytestream and identifies the messages and extracts their parameters. Messages are the units used to describe the communication behavior in an ICD. Since the communication behavior is being compared to the one specified in the ICD, this representation is most appropriate and most meaningful to the analyst. The interpretation was implemented in a tool that takes as input information from the ICD and a byte-stream as captured in the previous step. The ICD information is used to identify the messages and interpret their content. The output of the tool is an ordered list of messages, each with its timing information and the parameters as described above. The information extracted by our tool is needed by the analyst to be able to analyze the traces for existing anomalies (sequence, parameter, and timing).
Visualization
The output of the previous step is a sequence of messages in textual format. As a basis for analyzing the communication behavior, this representation still suffers from a lack of abstraction and filtering capabilities that would make the analysis task sufficiently efficient. In this step, we visualize the previously generated information in order to address these issues. We have developed a tool called DynSAVE for visualizing the communication behavior in a diagram similar to the UML sequence diagram (www.uml.org). The sequence diagram was chosen as a means for representing the communication for two reasons (1) the same or a similar notation is used in some ICD's and (2) it illustrates all aspects of the communication necessary to detect anomalies of the kind discussed above. In a sequence diagram, each system is represented as a vertical bold line (life line) and each message is illustrated as a horizontal directed arrow, annotated with the name of the message and additional information (see Figure 5 ). For each message, the diagram displays its name, parameters and timing information. The resemblance of this information with the anomaly classes is not coincidental but rather desired in Parameter Timing Name order to focus the analyst on the information necessary to verify the communication behavior.
Name. The message name is the name that is used in the ICD to refer to that message (e.g. Filter). The message name indicates the role of the message in the protocol. The names of messages are important for (1) deriving a general understanding of the communication, and (2) detect sequencing issues. In our experience, analysts can very quickly derive an understanding of the communication by simply looking at the names of the messages that are being exchanged.
Parameters. In erroneous communication behavior, the parameters violate constraints on individual parameters (local) or in combination with other parameters (global). Visualizing these parameters enables the analyst to detect both kinds of constraint violations.
Timing. In order to be enable analysts to check the communication for violation of timing constraints, the diagram shows, for each message, the time that has elapsed since the occurrence of the last message.
With the message annotations, the analyst has enough information to reason about violations of message sequencing, parameter constraints, and timing constraints. Zooming features and search capabilities enable the analyst to comprehend the communication behavior and quickly find the existing anomalies.
It is well known and widely accepted that a powerful visualization allows for efficient data mining and quick comprehension [KEI02] . DynSAVE makes use of the visualization as a vehicle for illustrating complex sequences of messages and provides features to gain insight and find anomalies.
Evaluation
The evaluation step compares the planned sequence with the actual identifying deviations and highlights identified issues. This step is still under development.
CASE STUDY
We will now describe its application to the CFDP protocol (Figure 1) using some examples to illustrate the approach and the visual representation produced by DynSAVE and how it can be used to gain insight and detect anomalies in complex communication sequences. Although important and crucial to the correctness of the validation, we will omit the capturing and parsing step and explain the validation from a user's point of view on the visual representation of the communication sequences.
Before we get into to the example, we will describe in more detail how CFDP is used at JHU/APL and some of the problems that spawned this analysis.
CFDP -A Mission Data System Protocol
CFDP is used to transmit files to and from spacecraft. The protocol is "capable of operating in a wide variety of mission configurations, from relatively simple low earth orbit spacecraft to complex arrangements of orbiters and landers supported by multiple ground facilities and transmission links" [CCSDS 727.0-B-4].
A subset of CFDP is currently being used by the MESSENGER deep space mission to downlink files of telemetry packets and images from the on-board Solid State Recorder (SSR) to the MOC. The RBSP near-earth mission also plans to use CFDP to downlink telemetry packet files.
Current MESSENGER CFDP Implementation
In MESSENGER, the flight and ground software use distinct implementations of CFDP. On the flight side, computing resources are very limited, so JHU/APLproprietary, mission-specific software supports just the subset of CFDP needed there. On the ground side, where computing resources are more plentiful, a full implementation of CFDP from JPL is used. CCSDS command packets and telemetry frames transport the CFDP Protocol Data Units (PDUs).
MESSENGER is in the operations phase, so changes to the mission software are carefully controlled. New releases of JPL CFDP cannot be integrated; too many changes would be required. As a result, the version of CFDP software running in the ground system is quite old and does not include many of JPL's enhancements and bug fixes.
To analyze performance of the MESSENGER CFDP implementation, JHU/APL developed tools to extract histories of actual uplink PDUs from logged commands and transaction indications. Through manual inspection of the low level data, it is possible to find instances of less than optimal protocol operation. Retransmissions due to limitations of the ground software implementation are expected, but surprisingly, after years of operation, analysts discovered cases of the ground system sending out bursts of retransmission requests for the same data. The CFDP system was working, but inefficiently and not as planned.
Future RBSP CFDP Implementation
In RBSP, the JHU/APL software developers are considering using the same implementation of CFDP in both the flight and ground segments. As part of the conceptual design of the RBSP mission, JHU/APL conducted a trade study to determine which off-the-shelf CFDP implementation would be best suited to RBSP's ground software requirements.
The implementation by GSFC was selected for these key technical reasons:
• The implementation is an efficient library, suitable for use in both the flight and ground segments.
• Transaction data is accumulated in a file system, providing virtually unlimited persistent storage.
• The memory resident transaction state information is not persisted across runs, but the software is designed such that it is possible for JHU/APL to add this feature.
The flight side implementation will either reuse the JHU/APL implementation or integrate the GSFC CFDP library.
The GSFC CFDP software includes a test suite, allowing controlled, repeatable closed loop testing. This standalone testing verifies the protocol implementation, isolated from the transport layer.
The RBSP CFDP PDUs will be transported over command packets and telemetry frames, as in MESSENGER. When the CFDP library is integrated with the RBSP mission data system, the transport layer and choice of flight software CFDP implementation will influence protocol performance; PDUs and indications will be logged at the ground software interface to the CFDP library for end-to-end performance analysis of the integrated system.
Future MESSENGER CFDP Implementation
In response to the RBSP CFDP implementation trade study, the MESSENGER program at JHU/APL has recently decided to integrate GSFC CFDP, as enhanced by JHU/APL for RBSP, with their ground software.
The new CFDP software will be integrated with the existing MESSENGER ground software and tested with the hardware simulator in the flight software development lab. The existing performance analysis tools will be used to extract uplink PDUs from logged commands and transaction indications. To provide additional visibility into the end-to-end protocol behavior, as in RBSP, PDUs and indications will be logged at the ground software interface to the CFDP library. This performance data will be inspected to verify that the protocol is operating as planned.
The verified, integrated ground software system will be deployed to the MESSENGER MOC, where it will operate in "shadow mode" with the current system. In shadow mode, the CFDP software will receive PDUs but will not transmit PDUs; the current system will send the uplink PDUs necessary to progress the transactions. Performance data will be collected from the live and shadow mode systems, and the data will be inspected and compared to confirm that the new system improves performance as expected.
Finally, when the mission operations team has sufficient confidence in the new system, it will be brought online to perform all necessary CFDP processing for MESSENGER.
Uses of DynSAVE for CFDP at JHU/APL
Current CFDP performance analysis is based on manual inspection. DynSAVE, which provides higher level visualization and automated comparisons between planned and actual behaviors, will make it possible to automate comparison of planned to actual CFDP performance in the following areas:
• In the current MESSENGER CFDP implementation, DynSAVE will allow characterization of actual performance. This data will help guide the design of shadow mode testing of the future MESSENGER CFDP implementation.
• In the future RBSP CFDP implementation, DynSAVE will be used to compare planned to actual dynamic behavior during end-to-end testing and operations, helping to identify defects and inefficiencies. This information will be used to improve the software implementation and tune the software configuration parameters.
• In the future MESSENGER CFDP implementation, DynSAVE will support comparison of current and future system behavior during shadow mode testing. Once the new system is deployed, DynSAVE will be used as in RBSP to identify and correct defects and inefficiencies in the protocol operation.
The example presented below demonstrates how DynSAVE can be used to characterize actual CFDP performance and guide tuning of the software configuration for a specific application.
A brief discussion of some protocol details should provide the insight necessary to follow the discussions in this section. The sender (typically the satellite) and the receiver (typically the MOC) communicate using a protocol having the following message types: MetaData(X), FileData(Y), EOF, ACK(EOF), NAK(Z), FIN, ACK(FIN), CANCEL, and ACK(CANCEL) (see Figure 2) : MetaData(X). The sender sends a MetaData message as a request to transfer a file. The message specifies the size of the file to be transferred together with its filename.
FileData(Y).
The file to be transferred is sent as a series of FileData packets, each holding a small piece of the file. Along with the data, start offset and end offset for the transferred data is provided.
EOF.
When the all FileData packets have been sent, the sender sends an EOF.
ACK(EOF).
As soon as the EOF has been received, the receiver acknowledges by sending an ACK(EOF).
NAK(Z).
There are many modes of CFDP, and in the reliable mode with deferred NAKs, all FileData that was never received are listed as part of a NAK message. Upon receiving the NAK message, the sender resends all FileData packets requested in the NAK message.
FIN.
Once all FileData packets have been received and thus the file is complete, a FIN message is sent by the receiver.
ACK(FIN).
Upon receiving the FIN, the sender acknowledges by sending an ACK(FIN) message.
CANCEL.
The transmission can be canceled at any time by issuing a CANCEL message.
ACK(CANCEL).
Upon receiving the CANCEL, the sender acknowledges by sending an ACK(CANCEL) message.
Rules. There are a set of rules that can be formulated as follows:
(1) Check that received FileData are not NAKed * (2) Check for duplicate FileDatas * (3) Check that we have all FileDatas upon FIN * (4) Check that identical NAKs are not sent back-to-back unless the NAK-timer went off
Example
The trace depicted in Figure 6 shows the communication between the sender and the receiver. The built-in GSFC CFDP testbed is configured to drop 10% of the FileData packets so that one can study how the CFDP protocol behaves. The diagram shows that the sender initially sends a MetaData message indicating that the size of the file to be transmitted is 500,000 bytes, followed by 447 FileData messages to the receiver. The size of each FileData message is 997 bytes so one can already determine that 502 FileData messages are needed to transfer the file. Thus 55 (502 -447) FileData messages were lost in the first series of transmissions and need to be NAKed. This particular configuration of CFDP allows for 20 gaps to be NAKed, as is illustrated in the diagram by NAK(20 Gaps).
Figure 6. CFDP example trace
The sender responds by resending 270 FileData and again the receiver NAKs 20 gaps, indicating that FileData packets are still missing.
The sender responds by resending 109 FileData packets and the receiver NAKs 14 Gaps.
The sender responds by resending 12 FileData packets and the receiver NAKs 2 Gaps.
The sender responds by resending 2 FileData packets and the receiver responds by issuing a FIN message indicating the entire file has now been received, which leads the sender to respond with an ACK(FIN) and the session is over.
An analysis of the file transfer session reveals that instead of receiving 502 FileData packets as was necessary, 840 FileData packets were actually received. This fact is revealed by our approach, which indicated that rules number 1 and 2 were repeatedly violated (see lighting icons in the diagram).
After much analysis, it was concluded that due to the configuration of CFDP, the 20 th gap was used to NAK all remaining FileDatas, which also included FileDatas that were already received. In essence, this means that ~70% of the bandwidth was wasted making the file transfer 70% more expensive than necessary. A detailed analysis of the session revealed that all FileDatas were actually received already after the second transfer of FileDatas, but due to the configuration, the CFDP protocol was not aware of this fact and instead re-requested FileDatas that it already had received. This configuration option and its consequences were documented in the source code of CFDP by the programmer. At the same time, the "users" of CFDP, who are very well versed in the expected behavior of CFDP as specified in its official documents, did not expect CFDP to behave in this manner. They expected CFDP to never NAK already received FileData packets and behave in a very efficient manner. Thus, the actual behavior deviated considerably from the planned behavior. We think this is an eye-opening example of a situation where emerging behavior of systems of systems is very difficult to understand. There are many different configuration parameters of CFDP and it is not easy to understand what the effects of various settings and combinations of these parameters are. The studied version of CFDP "happened" to be configured in such a way that "efficiency" was traded for "less memory consumption." In flight software where memory is traditionally scarce, such a trade off can be desirable, but since this was an investigation into using this version of CFDP on the ground where memory is not scarce and efficiency is important, the emerging behavior was not desirable. Our conclusion is that such emerging behavior is very difficult to detect unless a systematic approach is used.
Discussion
The example shown and discussed above was not carefully selected from a large set of traces but represent communication patterns derived from the testing environment. The example shows that anomalies in the communication are difficult to detect and that it is difficult to understand the impact on system behavior from various configuration settings.
This it is not very surprising. The anomalies do not have an immediate and clearly visible effect to end-users, scenario testers or integration testers but they often manifest themselves in some odd, unexplainable behavior, if at all. The discussion of the example trace shows that the visualization illuminates the suspicious information details that enable the analyst to detect even subtle anomalies. Although the file transfer appeared to be correct, our approach makes it possible for the analyst to detect such issues. Ultimately, this is how the analyst can detect anomalies, find their sources, and correct them. The fact that these traces are not just mere examples but are communication traces that have actually been analyzed and that issues have been detected shows that the approach does work in practice.
The larger goal of this work is to increase the quality and the efficiency of the verification process for system communications. The approach was introduced to JHU/APL where an architect of the Common Ground System conducted the analysis described in the examples. Comparing the traditional approach for verifying communication behavior with the one provided by DynSAVE, the architect remarked: This not only supports FC-MD's claim that the approach provides appropriate support for communication verification and represents an improvement to the traditional process, but it also shows that the application of this approach can help to improve the specification. The CFDP specification would be best described using state tables, but those are only in the implementer's guide, and they haven't been kept up to date. It is not clear it is not clear whether or not NAKing data that has been received is a violation of the specification, but it is a reasonable interpretation. Providing clear interpretations of the specification and clarifying such issues might be a step towards resolving the issue of ambiguous ICD's.
RELATED WORK
The correctness of communication protocols has long been recognized as an issue worth investigation. Several approaches have been developed to address different aspects of a communication.
One of the most studied ways to address communication issues are formal validation approaches. The idea behind these validation approaches is the ensuring of safety and liveness properties. Safety refers to the absence of deadlocks etc. while liveness pertains to ensuring that the protocol performs its intended functions [PRO91] . Many techniques have been proposed to conduct a syntactical and semantical verification of the protocol [AMT98] [KLE94] [ SYV92] . Their goal is to assess the correctness of the protocol during design time.
We assume that the design of the protocol adheres to both the soundness and liveness properties. Our work takes the previous work one step further by verifying whether systems actually implement the protocol properly and communicate according to the intended behavior. To our knowledge, such verification has not yet been proposed and there are no tools available to support the entire process from capturing the communication data to its visualization.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The communication in a network of systems plays an integral role in its reliability. However, failures of systems to follow the specified protocol frequently occur. We have discussed concrete communication issues that can arise, mapped them to deviations of the communication to the protocol, and defined a set of anomalies that characterize these deviations.
We have presented an approach for verifying the correctness of the communication, i.e. whether the communication adheres to the rules defined in the specification. Our approach supports the capturing of the communication behavior, the detection of anomalies, and the discovery of the issue that caused the communication problem.
The approach has been applied to applications of the Common Ground System at JHU/APL. We have presented examples of traces that were recorded during the normal operation of the Common Ground System and its communication with satellites and discussed how the visualization facilitates the verification process. In this paper, we have solely focused on the CFDP protocol and its constraints, which is widely used for transferring data from spacecraft to ground systems. DynSAVE's visualization of the communication behavior has proven to be powerful in that it enables analysts to detect anomalies, relate them, and ultimately find the source of the problem. Especially for large, or multiple traces, the approach of manually scanning the diagram for anomalies can become time consuming and the analyst might miss some. To address this problem, we are currently working on extending DynSAVE with an automatic evaluation feature that takes a protocol and constraints as input and automatically produces a diagram that is annotated with error markers where anomalies occur. Such an evaluation has been implemented for static software architectures and has shown to be supportive in the analysis process. Ms. Sally Godfrey has been with NASA for over 30 years, during which she has managed the development of many large flight dynamics software ground systems. She has also been involved the software process improvement as a member of the Software Engineering Laboratory at GSFC for over 10 years. Currently Ms. Godfrey is a member of the NASA Software Working Group, an Agency advisory group for recommending software engineering policies, standards, and best practices. Ms. Godfrey is the Software Process Improvement Project Manager for GSFC as well as the Center's Engineering Process Group Lead. Ms. Godfrey has a B.S. in Mathematics from University of Maryland, as well as some graduate studies in computer sciences. She has coauthored papers on the use of several technologies in ground systems, and on process improvement methodologies, including the use of CMMI.
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